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THE ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE AND THE
RIGHT TO ACCOMMODATION IN THE WORKPLACE
FOR EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES
JUDITH KEENE*
RESUME
Cet article examine les obligations 16gales d~coulant du Code des droits de lapersonne
de l'Ontario en ce qui concerne l'adaptation n6cessaire au regard des personnes
handicap6es dans les lieux de travail. Bien qu'on se concentre sur le milieu du travail,
la loi s'applique A d'autres domaines r6gis par le Code, tels que les services, les
installations et le logement. L'auteur se penche sur les d6cisions de la Cour supreme
du Canada et de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario Colombie-Britannique (Public Service
Employee Relations Commission) c. BCGSEU (x affaire Meiorin >) et Entrop v.
Imperial Oil Ltd. et conclut que dans la plupart des cas ofi un employ6 est d6favoris6
du fait qu'une adaptation n'a pas 6t6 faite pour tenir compte d'un handicap, l'affaire
Entrop n'a pas vraiment de cons6quences n6gatives sur celle du plaignant en fonction
du Code des droits de la personne de l'Ontario. La norme qui existe en matiire
d'adaptation demeure appr6ciable.
There are two main situations in which a disabled person may seek legal advice
because of discrimination in employment. In the first, a disabled person is barred from
employment, or from promotion, solely because of the employer's mistaken belief that
a person with that disability cannot do the job.
The second situation arises where an employee with a disability acknowledges that
there are job requirements that he or she is (temporarily or permanently) no longer
able to meet, so she or he requires suitable accommodation in the workplace.
This paper addresses the situation of employees who acknowledge that they need
accommodation, so I will deal with the first type of case only briefly. If the employee
asserts that he or she can do the job as it exists,1 proof of incapacity lies with the
employer.2 Further, there is authority for the proposition that the employer must assess
© 2001, Judith Keene, 15 March 2001. Judith Keene is a lawyer with the Clinic Resource Office,
Legal Aid Ontario. Opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not those of Legal Aid
Ontario. Thanks to Brian Eyolfson of Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto for his thoughtful
editorial and substantive assistance.
1. See discussion of the establishment of a primafacie case of discrimination, below.
2. See J. Keene, Human Rights in Ontario, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 178-82, which
addresses this point.
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each case individually, by testing the employee against the actual job requirements, 3
rather than making blanket rules barring people with a specific disability. If the
employee "fails" the test, the employer has a duty to inquire about the facts of the
employee's medical situation, assess it in relation to the actual job requirements, and
accommodate the individual to the point of undue hardship.4
CHARACTERIZING THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE ONTARIO HUMAN
RIGHTS CODE
The Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 identifies several specific actions that
amount to discrimination. 5 Two are relevant for the purpose of this article; a breach
of section 9 through a direct or deliberate action, and constructive discrimination.
The type of discrimination often referred to as "direct" is obvious even to those with
little experience in human-rights issues. Examples that come to mind include a
decision or rule of the employer that a particular job is not open to women, or to persons
with a back injury, or to anyone who has made a Workers' Compensation claim.
Historical examples include jobs explicitly segregated on the basis of race or religion.
No provision of the Code actually refers to "direct" discrimination. Section 9 reads as
follows:
9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a
right under this Part.
The "Part" referred to is Part I of the Code, which sets out the basic rights to be free
from discrimination.
Constructive discrimination is discrimination that does not arise from explicit differ-
entiation on a prohibited ground. It occurs when a requirement, qualification or factor
3. See Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297 at 1313-
14, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 11 C.H.R.R. )/204, Sopinka J., Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta
(Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489 at 513-14, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417, Wilson J., British
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights),
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 868, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
4. Thwaites v. Canada (Armed Forces) (1993), 19 C.H.R.R. D/259, 93 C.L.L.C. at para. 17,025
(C.H.R.T.), application for judicial review dismissed, [1994] 3 F.C. 38, 3 C.C.E.L. (2d) 290, 21
C.H.R.R. 1/224, 94 C.L.L.C. at para. 17,040, 49 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1102 (T.D.), (sub nom. Canada
(A.G.) v. Thwaites), concerned a member of the naval service who was discharged because of Armed
Forces assumed that someone infected with HIV would be unfit for service. The board of inquiry
found that the Canadian Human Rights Act had been breached. The decision contains an interesting
review of the progression of caselaw on the issue of risk as it relates to the "reasonable and bona
fide" defence (the board concluded that there is a concept of "tolerable risk" and that the analysis
must be employment-specific), and the requirement on employers to assess each case individually, rather
than making blanket rules about various disabilities. The board ruled that the employer had a duty to
inquire about the facts of the complainant's medical situation, assess it in relation to the actual job
requirements, and offer reasonable accommodation. For a discussion of the concept of accommodation,
see below.
5. See sections 9, 11, 12, and 13.
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that is not a prohibited ground of discrimination is imposed on everybody in a
situation, and the requirement, qualification, or factor creates an especially onerous
burden or a barrier for persons identifiable by a personal characteristic that is a
prohibited ground of discrimination. The same phenomenon is often referred to as
"adverse effect" discrimination in jurisprudence under section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6 It is sometimes even referred to as "indirect"
discrimination. 7
Constructive discrimination has been codified since 1981 in section 11 of Ontario's
human rights legislation, which is set out below.
In the context of this paper, constructive discrimination arises where an employee's
disability renders him or her unable to perform all aspects of employment as he or she
used to, but the employer requires a disabled employee to perform the job exactly as
he or she used to. In this type of case, the employer's expresses the position by saying,
"You're not being fired because you are disabled, you're being fired because you can't
do the job."
Because of a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal,8 there may be some utility
in attempting, at the outset, to characterize the type of discrimination at issue. To put
it in a nutshell for the moment, if the discrimination can be defined as "constructive,"
the employer may, on the face of it, have a slightly lighter burden in establishing a
defence. However, I suggest that any advantage to the employer in this context is
illusory, because in either case the employer must establish accommodation to the
point of undue hardship, and this is a stringent test to meet.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are two provisions of the Code that are applicable in cases in which accommo-
dation of disability in employment is at issue. Section 11 provides as follows:
11. (1) A right of a person under Part I is infringed where a requirement, qualifica-
tion or factor exists that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that results
in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons who are identified
by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the person is a member,
except where,
(a) the requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bonafide in the
circumstances; or
(b) it is declared in this Act, other than in section 17, that to discriminate
because of such ground is not an infringement of a right. R.S.O. 1990, c.
H. 19, s. 11 (1).
6. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
7. Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 18 at paras. 65, 70 (C.A.). This usage is the most
confusing, as "indirect" discrimination is more properly used to describe situations in which A gets
B to perform a discriminatory act on his or her behalf.
8. Ibid.
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(2) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall not find that a require-
ment, qualification or factor is reasonable and bonafide in the circumstances unless
it is satisfied that the needs of the group of which the person is a member cannot be
accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodat-
ing those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health
and safety requirements, if any. (S.O. 1994, c. 27, s. 65, eff. 17 April 1995)
(3) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall consider any standards
prescribed by the regulations for assessing what is undue hardship. (S.O. 1994, c.
27, s. 65, eff. 17 April 1995)
Section 17 provides as follows:
17. (1) A right of a person under this Act is not infringed for the reason only that the
person is incapable of performing or fulfilling the essential duties or requirements
attending the exercise of the right because of handicap.
(2) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall not find a person incapa-
ble unless it is satisfied that the needs of the person cannot be accommodated
without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs,
considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety
requirements, if any.
(3) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall consider any standards
prescribed by the regulations for assessing what is undue hardship. (S.O. 1994, c.
27, s. 65, eff. 17 April 1995)
Section 11 is a statement of a circumstance in which the Code is breached. It is cited
by the complainant in making the complaint, although, because of the exceptions
contained in the provision, it has been referred to as a defence. 9 Section 17 is a defence.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, in Ontario Nurses'Assn. v. Orillia Soldiers Memorial
Hospital 10 held that the defences set out in section 11 apply to cases of adverse effect
discrimination, and section 17 applies to cases of direct discrimination.
ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE
There is considerable caselaw that deals with establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination;'1 for this purpose, the following quote from O'Malley v. Simpson-
Sears,12 should suffice. In O 'Malley, the Supreme Court found that a prima facie case
of discrimination
9. Ibid. at para. 67.
10. (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 692 (C.A.).
11. See W. Tarnopolsky and W. Pentney, Discrimination and The Law, looseleaf ed. (Toronto: Car-
swell), B. Vizkelety, Proving Discrimination in Canada (Toronto: Carswel, 1987), and Keene,
supra note 2 at 124-41.
12. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 64 N.R. 161, 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102.
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is one which covers allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete
and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant's favour in the absence of an
answer from the respondent... (at D13108).
In clear cases of direct discrimination, the employee is refused the job or promotion
because the employer discovers that he or she is disabled. The primafacie case usually
focuses on proving the reason for the decision taken by the employer, often through
circumstantial evidence. 13
In cases of constructive discrimination, the prima facie case is met by establishing
that the "requirement, qualification or factor" exists, that it "results in the exclusion,
restriction or preference of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited
ground of discrimination," and that the complainant is a member of that group.
The onus then shifts to the respondent to establish a defence. 14
DEFENCES
Defences to a complaint of direct discrimination are listed in the Code. For employ-
ment discrimination on the ground of handicap, the defence is found in section 17.
The effect of section 17 is that there is an exception to the prohibition against
discrimination because of handicap in employment when the complainant "is incapa-
ble of performing ... the essential requirements" of the employment "because of
handicap." However, the section specifically states that the complainant cannot be
found to be incapable unless the Commission, the board of inquiry or a court "is
satisfied that the needs of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship
on the [employer], considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health
and safety requirements, if any."
In situations in which an employer is contemplating firing because of a handicap-
related inability to perform a job, section 17 requires that the employer be able to
answer the following questions affirmatively:
1 Is the person unable to perform the requirement because of handicap?
2. Is the part of the job that the person is unable to do "essential"?
3. Has there been accommodation short of undue hardship?
In cases of constructive employment discrimination on the basis of disability, the
respondent's .burden of proof can be paraphrased from section 11. If there is an
exception listed in the Code that allows discrimination in the specific situation, the
respondent must prove that it applies. If not, the employer must establish that the
specific job requirement that is causing the difficulty is "reasonable and bonafide in
the circumstances."
13. See Keene, supra note 2 at 337-41.
14. For the latest confirmation of this rule from the Supreme Court of Canada, see British Columbia
(Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), supra note 3.
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To establish reasonableness, the respondent must show that the requirement is reason-
ably necessary to the operation of the business, that there is a rational, objective basis
for the requirement, and that there is no reasonable alternative.1 5 In Cameron v.
Nel-GorNursing Home,16 a human-rights board of inquiry affirmed that not all aspects
of a job can be considered essential.
If a requirement does not meet the reasonableness standard, it cannot be maintained
as a requirement. Further inquiry into whether it is bona fide or into reasonable
accommodation, is unnecessary. 17 In British Columbia (Public Service Employee
Relations Commission) v. B. C.G.S.E. U, a particular standard of aerobic capacity was
found by the Supreme Court of Canada to fail the "reasonableness" test.1 8
The "bona fide" test, which also has a component of objective reasonableness, has
been delineated by the Supreme Court in most of the cases cited herein, most notably
in Large v. Stratford. 19 It was recently set out in Meiorin that
the employer must ... demonstrat[e] that it adopted the particular standard with an
honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the accomplishment of its
purpose, with no intention of discriminating against the claimant.20
Again, where there is no finding that the requirement is bona fide, inquiry into
reasonable accommodation is unnecessary; the requirement cannot stand.
There is considerable caselaw on the meaning of the individual terms reasonable and
bona fide, and if either is not established, the adequacy of any accommodation does
not save the employer from a finding that the Code has been breached. However, the
establishment of reasonableness and bonafides is not sufficient. The employer does
not meet the "reasonable and bona fide" test without establishing accommodation to
15. The Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the "reasonable" test includes Ontario (Human
Rights Commission) v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 at 208-09, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 14,
McIntyre J., Caldwell v. Stuart, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 603 at 622-23, 15 D.L.R. (4th) 1, McIntyre J.,
Brossard (Ville) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279 at 310-12,
53, D.L.R. (4th) 609, Beetz J., Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra note 3, and Central Alberta School
District #23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, 141 N.R. 185,95 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 16 C.H.R.R. D/425.
Also see Toronto Dominion Bank v. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) (1998), 32 C.H.R.R. D/261
(F.C.A.), Entrop, supra note 7, and generally, Keene, supra note 2, at 135-36 and 200-15, and W.
Tamopolsky and W. Pentney, supra note 11.
16. (1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2170.
17. See Borough of Etobicoke, supra note 15, at 207-08, McIntyre J., O'Malley, supra note 12, at 555,
McIntyre J., Saskatoon (City), supra note 3, at 1308-10, Sopinka J., Central Alberta Dairy Pool,
supra note 2, at 506, Wilson J., Large v. Stratford (City), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 733, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 193,
at para. 33, Sopinka J., and British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v.
B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 20-21, 59, McLachlin J. [hereinafter Meiorin].
18. Meiorin, supra note 17 at para. 83. See also paras. 73-76: "passing the resulting aerobic standard has
not been shown to be reasonably necessary to the safe and efficient performance of the work of a
forest firefighter... the goal should have been to measure whether members of all groups require the
same minimum aerobic capacity to perform the job safely and efficiently."
19. Large, supra note 17.
20. Meiorin, supra note 17 at para. 60.
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the point of undue hardship. This is clear in the wording of the Ontario Code, and in
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions in which the exercise is not so clearly spelled
Out.2 1
ACCOMMODATION TO THE POINT OF UNDUE HARDSHIP
Both section 11 and section 17 of the Code require accommodation to the point of
undue hardship.
If there is no evidence that accommodation was even considered, the employer has
not met the duty to accommodate. If there was evidence that accommodation was
considered and rejected, the reasons for the rejection are subject to evaluation to see
whether the accommodation at issue would constitute undue hardship. In the absence
of such evidence, the Human Rights Commission should appoint a board of inquiry. 22
In British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council
of Human Rights)23 in the context of an absolute ban on the issuance of driver's
licences to persons with a particular vision disability, the Supreme Court of Canada
outlined the test that has to be met to justify no accommodation:
[Tihere are at least two ways in which the Superintendent could show that a stan-
dard that permits no accommodation is reasonably necessary. First, he could show
that no one with the particular disability could ever meet the desired objective of
reasonable highway safety. For example, using current technology, someone who is
totally blind cannot safely operate a motor vehicle on the highway. Since accommoda-
tion of such a person is impossible, it need not be further considered. Alternatively,
if the Superintendent could not show that accommodation is totally inconsistent
with his goal, he could show that accommodation is unreasonable because testing
for exceptional individuals who can drive safely despite their disability is impossi-
ble short of undue hardship.
An offer of an inadequate accommodation does not relieve the employer from
responsibility under the Code.24 Accommodations proposed by employers that were
not considered reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case include:
21. See, for example, British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council
of Human Rights), supra note 3 at para. 32: "In order to prove that its standard is 'reasonably
necessary', the defendant always bears the burden of demonstrating that the standard incorporates
every possible accommodation to the point of undue hardship, whether that hardship takes the form
of impossibility, serious risk or excessive cost."
22. Human-rights commissions have been successfully judicially reviewed when they failed to perform
this function appropriately. See Re Gill v. PSAC (1996), 25 C.H.R.R. D/439, Schut v. Canada (2
October 1996), T-584-95 (F.C.T.D.), Beznochuk v. Sprucelands (1995), 16 C.C.E.L. (2d) 114 (B.C.
S.C.), affd 29 C.H.R.R. D/269 (B.C. C.A.), Arnold v. Canada (HRC), [1997] 1 F.C. 582 (F.C.T.D.).
23. Supra note 3 at para. 32.
24. See cases noted below in this article, OPSEU v. Ministry of Community and Social Services, (1996)
89 O.A.C. 161, leave to appeal to C.A. refused, CA M17935 (C.A.), and McLoughlin v. British
Columbia (Ministry of Environment), (1999) 36 C.H.R.R. D/306. One illustrative Ontario example is
Munsch v. York Condominium Corporation No. 60 (1992), 18 C.H.R.R. D/339. That case involved a
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* Where a janitor who was a Seventh-Day Adventist objected to working a Friday
shift from 3 to 11, an offer that he work a four-day week, with substantial loss
in pay.25
* In a similar situation to the above, an offer of "contingent" employment, which
would reduce the former salary to half of the former salary.26
On the other hand, the employer is not required to supply a perfect solution, 27 as will
be discussed below.
DECIDING WHEN HARDSHIP WOULD BE "UNDUE"
Some general remarks have been made. Courts and tribunals have accepted that the
term undue used before hardship means that some hardship is "due" and employers
are expected to undertake some hardship. 28 All the cases say that the assessment of
whether accommodation of an individual would amount to undue hardship must be
done case by case.
In sections 11 and 17, the Code sets out the following factors: cost, outside sources of
funding, and health and safety requirements. Ontario boards of inquiry have rarely
had to deal with the assessment of undue hardship, as in most cases no accommodation
resident of a condominium who was confined to a wheelchair. The problem arose because the
condominium rules required residents to take showers in the change room of the pool area. The
tenant had been showering in her own apartment because the shower facilities were not easily
accessible to her. She was denied access to the pool on two occasions because she did not shower in
the pool area. From the time the complainant brought the access problem to the Corporation's
attention in 1985, the Corporation undertook a series of renovations to make the premises more
accessible to people with disabilities, including the construction of a wheelchair ramp. However, it
was not until 1987 that a bench was provided that would have made use of the shower in the pool
area reasonably accessible to the complainant. In 1988, further accommodation was made to the
showers (a hand-held spray) at the complainant's suggestion.
The board of inquiry held that the shower area was not reasonably accessible to the complainant
until the special bench was installed. Before that, the condominium could have accommodated the
complainant without undue hardship. It could have been flexible enough to allow her to shower in
her own unit before the bench was installed. Therefore, until the time it installed the bench, the
condominium was in breach of the Code. The board went on to find that, despite the fact that the
complainant could now shower in the pool area, it was reasonable that the rules be applied in a
flexible manner. Wheelchair residents and their guests should be allowed to shower in their own
units if they subjectively believe it is safer to do so and they are more comfortable in doing so.
25. Renaud, supra note 15.
26. O'Malley, supra note 12.
27. See Renaud, supra note 15. A compromise accommodation (a restricted driver's license) was
affirmed by a British Columbia Board of Inquiry in Hussey v. British Columbia (Ministry of Trans-
port) (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/349.
28. Renaud, supra note 15 at 984, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577, Sopinka J.: "The use of the term 'undue' infers
that some hardship is acceptable; it is only 'undue' hardship that satisfies this test." Also see Entrop,
supra note 7, at para- 96, Cameron v. Nel-Gor Nursing Home, supra note 16, Gohm v. Domtar
(1990), 12 C.H.R.R. D/161 at D1175, aff'd (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/479 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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is established, much less accommodation that might go beyond the requirements of
the Code.
In Central Alberta Dairy Pool,29 Wilson J. listed some of the factors that are relevant
to an assessment of undue hardship made under Alberta's human rights legislation (but
stressed that this is not a closed list): financial cost, disruption of a collective
agreement, size of employer's operation, safety risks, and who bears risk, and prob-
lems of morale of other employees.
Below is a brief discussion of cases that have elaborated upon the Central Alberta
Dairy Pool criteria. However, it is important to note at the outset that not all the listed
criteria are relevant under the Ontario Code. In a few cases, Ontario boards of inquiry,
citing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence based on other legislation, have
considered factors that do not have a clear connection to "cost, outside sources of
funding, and health and safety requirements." Most of these cases were decided under
the predecessor to the present Code, which did not set out specific criteria. The few
more recent cases in which factors other than cost, outside sources of funding, and
health and safety requirements have been considered are arguably incorrectly decided
in this respect.
With this caveat, the following caselaw further defines the Central Alberta Dairy Pool
list.
"Financial Cost"
In British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council
of Human Rights) the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out,
While in some circumstances excessive cost may justify a refusal to accommodate
those with disabilities, one must be wary of putting too low a value on accommo-
dating the disabled. It is all too easy to cite increased cost as a reason for refusing to
accord the disabled equal treatment. This Court rejected cost-based arguments in
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at paras.
87-94, a case where the cost of accommodation was shown to be modest. I do not
assert that cost is always irrelevant to accommodation. I do assert, however, that
impressionistic evidence of increased expense will not generally suffice. 30
Nine days' paid absence from employment to fulfill religious obligations was consid-
ered reasonable in Froese v. Pine Creek School Div. 31
The substitution of eight days' work at overtime rates for eight Saturdays at normal
rates was considered reasonable in Gohm v. Domtar32
29. Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra note 3 at 520-21.
30. Supra note 3 at para. 41.
31. (1978), (Man. Bd. of Inquiry).
32. Supra note 28.
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Paid absence for all Jewish teachers to observe the High Holy Days was considered
reasonable in Commission scolaire regionale de Chambly v. Bergevin.33
A requirement that a health centre install a $20,000 wheelchair ramp was not found
to inflict undue hardship. 34
Impressionistic evidence was insufficient to establish that a $75,000 annual extra
expense to make a movie theatre accessible was "undue. ' 35
A university was ordered to provide an interpreter for a deaf student. A cost of
$160,000 and the possibility that there might have to be a reduction of some services
to other students was not considered "undue."'36
"Disruption of a Collective Agreement"
The disruption must be fairly serious to constitute undue hardship, and the person
claiming disruption must have clear evidence of the claim. In Gohm v. Domtar,37 an
employee whose Sabbath was Saturday asked to be exempted from a job requirement
that she work a rotating Saturday shift about eight times a year. She offered to work
Sundays, either at the (higher) Sunday rate .or at the normal rate.
The employer could have used her on Sundays, but was unwilling to pay the Sunday
rate. The union refused to allow her to work Sundays at a normal rate. A human rights
tribunal found both the employer and the union had discriminated. The accommoda-
tion proposed was not "undue" for either of them. This decision was confirmed by the
Divisional Court on appeal. Note that the decision was made pursuant to the pre-1981
Code, which had no specific provision that codified constructive discrimination, and
therefore did not set out specific criteria for the consideration of undue hardship.
In Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud 38 liability of both the employer
and the union was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in a situation similar
to the Gohm case. The Court held that a union may become a party to discrimination
in two ways. First, it may cause or contribute to the discrimination by participating in
the formulation of the work rule that has the discriminatory effect on the complain-
ant-for example, if the rule forms part of the collective agreement. Second, a union
may be liable if it impedes the reasonable efforts of an employer to accommodate. If
reasonable accommodation is possible only with the union's co-operation, and the
union blocks the employer's efforts to remove or alleviate the discriminatory effect,
it becomes a party to the discrimination.
33. (1994), 169 N.R. 281 (S.C.C.). Note that the Ontario Court of Appeal rather inexplicably distin-
guished Chambly in Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services v. Grievance Settlement
Board (September 2000), C33367.
34. Quesnel v. London Educational Health Centre (1995), 28 C.H.R.R. D/474 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
35. Miele v. Famous Players Inc. (2000), 37 C.H.R.R. D/l.
36. Howard v. UBC (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/353 (B.C. H.R.C).
37. Supra note 28.
38. Supra note 15.
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However, the Court did suggest that the union might meet the undue hardship test if
it could show that a proposed accommodation results in "significant interference with
the rights of others."' 39 Interference with the rights of others was considered by an
Ontario board of inquiry in a recent decision involving services in residential accom-
modation.40 Once again, this is questionable, given the wording of the relevant provisions
of the Code. It is not clear that disruption of a collective agreement can be cited in cases
under the Ontario Code, unless the respondent can link the disruption to costs.
"Size of Employer's Operation"
In Re Peterborough Civic Hospital and ONA,41 a nurse who was a Jehovah's Witness
declined to perform blood transfusion duties and was fired. She was reinstated because
the number of nurses available to "hang blood" at any time was sufficient so that the
grievor could be exempted from this duty without jeopardy to the safety and care of
patients and the efficient operation of the hospital. The arbitrator therefore held that
the exemption of the grievor did not constitute undue hardship.
As with disruption of a collective agreement, it is arguable that the size of the employer's
operation is not a factor relevant to sections 11 or 17, except as linked to cost.
"Safety Risks, and Who Bears Risk"
Danger posed to others has been considered by Canadian courts and tribunals largely
in the context of age requirements for firefighters, pilots, and bus drivers.42 The cases
have focused on what kind of predictive evidence of risk will justify the infringement
of human rights. The courts have expressed a strong preference for clear, objectively
verifiable evidence of risk, and for assessment of the individual rather than the
imposition of blanket rules.
Danger to the individual himself was considered in Thwaites v. Canadian ArmedForces.43
That case concerned a member of the naval service who was discharged because of the
Force's assumption that someone infected with HIV would be unfit for service. The
tribunal found that the Canadian Human Rights Act had been breached. The decision
contains an interesting review of the progression of caselaw on the issue of risk as it relates
to the "reasonable and bonafide" defence (the tribunal concluded that there is a concept
of "tolerable risk" and that the analysis must be employment-specific), and the require-
ment for employers to assess each case individually, rather than making blanket rules
about various disabilities. The tribunal ruled that the employer had a duty to inquire
about the facts of the complainant's medical situation, assess it in relation to the actual
job requirements, and consider appropriate accommodation.
39. Renaud, supra note 15 at D/437.
40. Leonis v. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 741 (1998), 98-012 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
41. (1981), 3 L.A.C. (3d) 21.
42. Examples are Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke, supra note 15, and Day v. Moose
Jaw (1989), 11 C.H.R.R. D/217 (S.C.C.). Also see Hussey v. British Columbia (Ministry of Trans-
port) (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/349.
43. Supra note 4.
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Note that risk is considered at the "undue hardship" stage of the analysis, not at the
"reasonable and bonafide" stage.44
"Problems of Morale of Other Employees"
The most recent comment from-the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue was in
Meiorin:
Although serious consideration must of course be taken of the "objection of employees
based on well-grounded concerns that their rights will be affected", discrimination on
the basis of a prohibited ground cannot be justified by arguing that abandoning such a
practice would threaten the morale of the workforce: Renaud, supra, at p. 988, per
Sopinka J.; R. v. Cranston, [1997] C.H.R.D. No. 1 (QL).45
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Renaud suggested that a union might
meet the undue hardship test if it could show that a proposed accommodation results
in "significant interference with the rights of others." However, in that case there was
none of the clear objective evidence required to support a defence under human-rights
legislation. The cost of defending a threatened grievance was held not to constitute
undue hardship justifying a refusal to accommodate the appellant. The Court noted
that objections based on "attitudes inconsistent with human rights" are irrelevant.
However, the Court added that the duty to accommodate should not substitute discrim-
ination against other employees for the discrimination suffered by the complainant.
Outside the union situation, there is some acceptance of the idea that others in a group
might have to share some of the inconvenience of accommodating their peers. In
Janssen v. Ontario Milk Marketing Board,46 the complainant successfully opposed a
rule of the Board that had him bearing all of the extra cost of accommodating his
Sabbatarian religious requirements. The board of inquiry found that sharing the costs
among all of the farmers served by the Board (at a cost of 1 to 2 cents per hectolitre)
would not be unreasonable.
Boards of inquiry have frequently rejected claims that refusing to hire or rent to a
person of a particular race, sex, etc. could be justified by the negative reaction of other
employees, customers, or tenants.47
As with "disruption of a collective agreement" and "size of employer's operation," it
is arguable (in this case, highly arguable) that "problems of morale" is not a factor
relevant to those listed in sections 11 or 17.
44. In British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human
Rights), supra note 3, at para. 30, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that "the old notion that
Isufficient risk' could justify a discriminatory standard is no longer applicable. Risk can still be
considered under the guise of hardship, but not as an independent justification of discrimination."
45. Supra note 17 at para. 80.
46. (1990), 13 C.H.R.R. D/397.
47. Dubniczky v. J.LK. Kiriakopoulos Co. (1981), 2 C.H.R.R. D/485, Boyd v. Mar-Su Interior Decorators
(1978), (Ont Bd. lnq.), Cooper v. Belmont Property Management (1973), (Ont. Bd. Inq.), Segrave v.
Zeller's (1975), (Ont. Bd. Inq.), Imberto v. Vic and Tony Coiffure (1981), 2 C.H.R.R D/392.
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OTHER TYPES OF "HARDSHIP"
In Elliott v. Epp Centres,48 an Ontario board of inquiry concluded that failure by a
shopping centre to provide designated "handicapped" parking space and to install a
ramp constituted constructive discrimination against persons whose disabilities necessi-
tated reliance on a wheelchair for mobility. The board concluded that the requirement that
the shopping centre apply for the necessary municipal permits was not undue hardship.
THE MEJORIN AND ENTROP DECISIONS
In Meiorin,49 the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed a particular standard of aerobic
capacity set by the employer for its forest firefighters, under British Columbia's
human-rights legislation. The claimant, a female firefighter who had in the past
performed her work satisfactorily, failed to meet the aerobic standard after four
attempts and was dismissed. The claimant's union brought a grievance on her behalf.
The evidence adduced demonstrated that, owing to physiological differences, most
women have a lower aerobic capacity than most men and that, unlike most men, most
women cannot increase their aerobic capacity enough with training to meet the aerobic
standard. No credible evidence showed that the prescribed aerobic capacity was
necessary for either men or women to perform the work of a forest firefighter safely
and efficiently. The arbitrator found that the claimant had established a prima facie
case of adverse effect discrimination and that the government had not discharged its
burden of showing that it had accommodated the claimant to the point of undue
hardship. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from that decision. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The aerobic standard imposed in Meiorin was constructive discrimination by most
people's standards. However, the Court noted that the difference between direct and
constructive discrimination cannot always be neatly characterized:
For example, a rule requiring all workers to appear at work on Fridays or face
dismissal may plausibly be characterized as either directly discriminatory (because
it means that no workers whose religious beliefs preclude working on Fridays may
be employed there) or as a neutral rule that merely has an adverse effect on a few
individuals (those same workers whose religious beliefs prevent them from working
on Fridays). On the same reasoning, it could plausibly be argued that forcing
employees to take a mandatory pregnancy test before commencing employment is a
neutral rule because it is facially applied to all members of a workforce and its
special effects on women are only incidental. 50
In Meiorin, the Supreme Court removed a problem that has existed in some human-
rights statutes, such as the Canadian Human Rights Act. The problem arises because
many human-rights statutes do not contain specific provisions dealing with construc-
48. (1993),26C.H.R.R.D/177.
49. Supra note 17.
50. Ibid. at para. 27.
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tive discrimination. Partly as a function of the wording of the relevant legislation and
partly as a result of jurisprudence, a situation had evolved in which an employer had
a lighter test for justification in a case of constructive discrimination than in a case of
direct discrimination, 51 including no duty to accommodate. 52 The Supreme Court cited
seven extremely good reasons why this made no sense,53 and they promptly righted
the situation by imposing the same test for establishing a bona fide occupational
requirement in both cases:
Having considered the various alternatives, I propose the following three-step test
for determining whether a prima facie discriminatory standard is a BFOR. An
employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of
probabilities:
51. The Supreme Court in Meiorin summarized the situation as follows:
19 The conventional approach to applying human rights legislation in the workplace requires the
tribunal to decide at the outset into which of two categories the case falls: (1) "direct discrimination",
where the standard is discriminatory on its face, or (2) "adverse effect discrimination", where the
facially neutral standard discriminates in effect: Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v.
Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [19851 2 S.C.R. 536 at p. 551, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (hereinafter "O'Malley"),
per McIntyre J. If a prima facie case of either form of discrimination is established, the burden shifts
to the employer to justify it.
20 In the case of direct discrimination, the employer may establish that the standard is a BFOR by
showing: (1) that the standard was imposed honestly and in good faith and was not designed to
undermine the objectives of the human rights legislation (the subjective element); and (2) that the
standard is reasonably necessary to the safe and efficient performance of the work and does not place
an unreasonable burden on those to whom it applies (the objective element). See Ontario (Human
Rights Commission) v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202 at pp. 208-09, 132 D.L.R. (3d)
14, per McIntyre J.; Caldwell v. Stuart, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 603 at pp. 622-23, 15 D.L.R. (4th) 1, per
McIntyre J.; Brossard (Ville) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279
at pp. 310-12, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 609, per Beetz J. It is difficult for an employer to justify a standard as
a BFOR where individual testing of the capabilities of the employee or applicant is a reasonable
alternative: Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489
at pp. 513-14, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417, per Wilson J.; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v.
Saskatoon (City), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297 at pp. 1313-14, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 481, per Sopinka J.
21 If these criteria are established, the standard is justified as a BFOR. If they are not, the standard
itself is struck down: Etobicoke, supra, at pp. 207-08, per McIntyre J.; O'Malley, supra, at p. 555, per
McIntyre J.; Saskatoon, supra, at pp. 1308-10, per Sopinka J.; Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra, at
p. 506, per Wilson J.; Large v. Stratford (City), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 733, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at para.
33, per Sopinka J.
122 A different analysis applies to adverse effect discrimination. The BFOR defence does not apply.
Prima facie discrimination established, the employer need only show: (1) that there is a rational
connection between the job and the particular standard, and (2) that it cannot further accommodate
the claimant without incurring undue hardship: O'Malley, supra, at pp. 555-59, per McIntyre J.;
Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra, at pp. 505-6 and 519-20, per Wilson J. If the employer cannot
discharge this burden, then it has failed to establish a defence to the charge of discrimination. In such
a case, the claimant succeeds, but the standard itself always remains intact.
52. See, for example, Bhinder v. C.N.R. (1985), 63 N.R. 185 (S.C.C.), and decisions and articles cited in
Meiorin, supra note 17 at paras. 28-29 and 31.
53. Meiorin, ibid. at paras. 2649.
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(1) That the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to
the performance of the job;
(2) That the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith
belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related
purpose; and
(3) That the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that legit-
imate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably neces-
sary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual
employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing
undue hardship upon the employer.54
In obiter, the Court included the Ontario legislation in its analysis. In doing so, the
Court apparently failed to note the content of Ontario's specific provisions dealing
with constructive discrimination, which had been introduced in its 1981 legislation,55
briefly mentioning only the accommodation requirements in section 24(2).56 This is
presumably a reference to the Code's reasonable and bonafide defence, applicable to
direct discrimination in employment based on age, sex, record of offences, and marital
status, which is found in section 24(1)(b). The Court understandably did not dwell on
legislation other than that of British Columbia; there is no analysis of the policy
reasons that Ontario might have both codified constructive discrimination and main-
tained a difference between direct and constructive discrimination.
What the Supreme Court did in Meiorin was not, as commonly reported, to remove
the differences between cases of constructive and adverse effect discrimination.
Instead, in the context of legislation that did not deal specifically with constructive
discrimination, it imposed a uniform "three-step test for determining whether a prima
facie discriminatory standard is a BFOR" (bonafide occupational requirement). 57
The phrase bonafide occupational requirement was removed from the present Ontario
Code in favour of the phrase reasonable and bona fide-a phrase that, not being
employment-centred, accords with all of the areas in which the Code is operative. If
a case identical on the facts to Meiorin had been argued on the basis of the existing
Ontario Code, section 11 on its plain wording would have dictated the same result as
the one imposed by the Supreme Court in Meiorin.
The Ontario Court of Appeal applied the Meiorin decision shortly after its release, in
Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd.58 In Entrop, an employer instituted a comprehensive
alcohol- and drug-testing policy for its employees. Although the policy mainly focused
on employees in safety-sensitive positions, it also provided for mandatory alcohol and
drug testing for all job applicants and all employees in certain listed circumstances.
54. Ibid at para. 54.
55. The Ontario cases cited by the Court in Meiorin were all cases based on Ontario human-rights
legislation in force prior to 1981, the date the present Code was enacted.
56. Meiorin, supra, note 17 at para. 52.
57. Ibid at para. 54.
58. Entrop, supra note 7.
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On a positive test, progressive discipline up to and including dismissal could be
imposed. Martin Entrop, an employee of Imperial, had suffered from alcohol abuse in
the early 1980s. Although he had not had a drink for over seven years, because he
worked in what Imperial Oil classified as a safety-sensitive job, the policy required
him to disclose his previous alcohol abuse problem to management. When he disclosed
it, he was automatically reassigned to another job. Although he was eventually
reinstated to his former position, he filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights
Commission, alleging that Imperial Oil discriminated against him in employment
because of his handicap, contrary to section 5(1) of the Ontario Code. Mr. Entrop was
successful before the board of inquiry. The board reviewed both the allegations
relating directly to Mr. Entrop and the application of the policy generally. In both cases,
the board found direct discrimination, and ruled that Imperial had not established the
defence set out in section 17.
Entrop was also successful before the Divisional Court when Imperial appealed the
order of the board. Imperial appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal
held that Imperial's policies of alcohol and drug testing, of requiring disclosure of past
substance-abuse problems by employees in safety-sensitive positions, and of automat-
ically reassigning those employees to non-sensitive positions were discriminatory on
the basis of handicap. The Court held that only the alcohol testing could be justified
under the Code, and only where the sanction for an employee testing positive was
tailored to an employee's circumstances.
Citing Meiorin, Laskin J.A. "imported" section 11 of the Code into the situation in
Entrop, acknowledging as he did so that allowing the respondents to rely on section
11 gave them a defence that would not have been available to them otherwise. He also
acknowledged that
[t]he wording of the statutory defences available to an employer under Ontario's
Code differs from the wording under the British Columbia Code. Section 11 of
Ontario's Code sets out in detail the elements of a BFOR; the comparable provision
of the British Columbia Code, s. 13(4), provides simply that "subsections (1) and
(2) do not apply with respect to a refusal, limitation, specification or preference
based on a bona fide occupational requirement." . . . In the case of handicap
discrimination, s. 17 of the Ontario Code has no counterpart in the British Columbia
Code. The difference in wording in the two statutes raises the question whether the
Supreme Court's three-step test for justifying a prima facie discriminatory work-
place rule should be applied in this case.59
However, he concluded that it should.
Laskin J.A. did allow that the defences provided for in section 11 should not be
available in some cases, but gave very limited examples:
Third, though the language of s. 11 does reflect the distinction between direct and
adverse effect discrimination--because it provides a BFOR defence "where a
59. Ibid. at 46-47, para. 77.
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requirement exists that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that
results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons who are
identified by prohibited ground of discrimination"--I would limit the situations to
which s. 11 does not apply to those few cases that can be "neatly characterized" as
cases of direct discrimination. I have in mind the kinds of cases referred by McIn-
tyre J. in Ontario v. Simpson Sears, supra--"No Catholics or no women or no
blacks are employed here"-where the requirement expressly includes a prohibited
ground of discrimination. So limiting the cases to which s. 11 does not apply is
consistent with the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's unified approach in
Meiorin. The case before us, however, is the kind of case where characterizing
whether the discrimination is direct or indirect is problematic and thus where s. 11
should be applied using the Meiorin test.60
Laskin J.A. stated several reasons for applying Meiorin to the Ontario legislation.
Among other reasons, he saw much clearer direction than a reading of Meiorin
arguably warrants; he appears to indicate61 that McLachlin J in Meiorin referred to
Ontario's section 11, whereas the only reference to the Ontario legislation in that
decision is to section 24.62
It appears that another important reason for Laskin J.A.'s application of Meiorin in
the case before him was his view that the employer's actions and policies could be
seen as constructive as well as direct discrimination. In this respect, he differed from
the board of inquiry:
Though important, characterizing the discrimination as direct or indirect was often
difficult. This case is a good example. Is the rule requiring all employees in safety-sen-
sitive positions to undergo random alcohol and drug testing facially neutral because it
applies to an entire segment of the workforce, or discriminatory on its face because it
targets substance abusers and perceived substance abusers? The Board of Inquiry held
that these Policy provisions were discriminatory on their face and constituted direct
discrimination on the ground of handicap. In this court, Imperial Oil contended that the
Policy was neutral on its face and that if it discriminated at all, the discrimination was
indirect. Because the Board found that the discrimination was direct, she held the only
defence available to Imperial Oil was under s. 17. Imperial Oil, on the other hand,
argued that it could rely on s. 11 of the Code.63
The bottom line in the Entrop situation, and in most other situations in which disabled
employees are disadvantaged by a failure to accommodate, is that Entrop has no real
negative effect on the complainant's case under the Ontario Code. It is true that now,
under section 11, the employer can attempt to justify disadvantageous treatment by
establishing that the job requirements are "reasonable and bona fide." However, on
the plain wording of section 11 (2), that cannot be done if the employer cannot establish
accommodation to the point of undue hardship. 64
60. Ibid. at 48, para. 80.
61. Ibid. at para. 79.
62. See Meiorin, supra note 17 at para. 52.
63. Entrop, supra note 7 at 43-44, para. 70.
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The same cannot be said of other situations covered by the Code. One example is race
discrimination in employment, for which the Code as written provides no defence.
Another, in the area of accommodation, is discrimination on the ground of receipt of
public assistance. It is to be hoped that such situations will always be so clearly
characterizable as "direct" as to fit within the narrow exception cited by the Court of
Appeal, or else clearly constructive. Otherwise, we could have the distasteful spectacle
of respondents adducing stereotypes as "facts" to support a "reasonable and bonafide"
defence.
Such a situation would clearly be contrary to public policy. In the 1981 Code, the-
Ontario legislature made some clear policy decisions. In addition to the incorporation
of explicit provisions dealing with constructive discrimination, the legislation pro-
vides defences to a primafacie case of discrimination in some cases, and not in others.
In some cases the defences are limited to specified situations; in others, they are
variations on the "reasonable and bonafide" defence. The point is that, in all examples
in which a defence is not provided for in the Code, there are demonstrable policy
reasons behind the omission. For example, there is no "reasonable and bona fide"
defence against aprimafacie case of race discrimination in the workplace, nor against
a case of discrimination on the ground of receipt of social assistance in housing, nor
is there any logical reason why defences in such cases should exist. A defence arguably
should not be inserted by interpretation, short of a successful argument under the
Charter.
Obviously lower courts and tribunals in Ontario are bound by Entrop in cases that are
not distinguishable. In cases in which a defence would be supplied that is unavailable
on a plain reading of the Code, the major implications for counsel are two.
First, courts and tribunals sometimes show a tendency to simplify by ignoring
evidence of direct discrimination where elements of constructive discrimination exist
in the case before them. This occurred recently in the Kearney case.65 This tendency
should obviously be resisted as far as possible.
64. See Jeppesen v. Ancaster (Town), [2001 ] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 1, (Ont. Bd. Inq.) online: QL (OHRB) in
which a board of inquiry, applying Entrop, concluded that the requirement that a firefighter have the
degree of visual acuity needed to drive an ambulance discriminated against a complainant with a
vision disability. See particularly the remarks of the Board at para. 116.
65. Kearney v. Bramalea Inc. (No. 2) (1998), 34 C.H.R.R. D/I at D/34 (Ont. Bd. Inq.), aff'd Ontario
(Human Rights Commission) v. Shelter Corp., [2001] O.J. No. 297 (Ont. Div. CL). In Kearney, the
Board of Inquiry found that the use of rent-to-income ratios/minimum income criteria violates
sections 2 (1), 4, 9, and 11 of the Code, on the grounds of sex, marital status, citizenship, place of
origin, family status and receipt of public assistance, whether used alone or in conjunction with other
selection criteria or requirements.
A frustrating aspect of the Kearney decision was that, although it cited section 9, the board confined
its analysis to whether the impugned practice constituted constructive discrimination under section
11 of the Code. The complainants had argued that, on the facts, the practice was also a deliberate and
direct attempt to ensure that persons on social assistance be excluded. However, the board declined
to rule on that argument, since it had already found an infringement of section 11. Had the board
found that there was direct discrimination against recipients of social assistance, (or any of the other
grounds at issue), there would have been no need to reconsider any evidence justifying the practice,
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Where a case is distinguishable from Entrop, it might also be worthwhile to point out
that, in University of British Columbia v. Berg,66 the Supreme Court declined to import
a defence into human-rights legislation where none existed, even where the fact
situation, which involved safety, was compelling. Lamer C.J., for La Forest,
L'Heureux-Dub6, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, and lacobucci JJ., stated,
Unlike many human rights codes, the British Columbia Act at the relevant time did
not contain any defence to a finding that a complainant had been denied accommo-
dations, services or facilities on prohibited grounds. That is, it was not open to the
respondent School to argue that the treatment of the complainant, although based on
a prohibited ground of discrimination, was nevertheless reasonably justified...
Some concluding remarks are in order. An important feature of the Act at the time
of Berg's complaint was its absolute prohibition of discrimination. That is, there
was no provision allowing a defence where the denial of a service or facility was
based on prohibited grounds of discrimination, yet could be justified with reference
to competing interests, such as safety. I believe that the School and its representa-
tives acted in good faith, and thought that there were good reasons for acting as they
did. Dr. Rodgers might reasonably have had concerns about giving Berg a key not
because of her mental disability itself, but because of the safety issues raised by the
incident. Similarly, faculty members might have denied the rating sheet because
they felt they could not give Berg a useful or positive recommendation. Under the
amended s. 3, these issues would, no doubt, have been the focus of the evidence and
argument before the member-designate, instead of the issue on these appeals.
However, the absence of a defence provision in the Act as it stood at the time of
Berg's complaint should not lead us, as I think it did the Court of Appeal in this
case, to interpret s. 3 in an overly restrictive fashion. The Act must be allowed its
full scope of application, and its particular operation in situations such as this, if
undesirable, is a matter for legislative attention. The recent amendments to the Act
show that such responses are always possible.6 7
ACCOMMODATION: DUTIES OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE
Obviously, where the employer has no reason to suppose that the employee needs
accommodation for reasons related to personal characteristics listed in the Code, he
or she does not breach the Code by failing to accommodate. 68 Having said that,
however, the employer has no defence of ignorance where the need is obvious or where
the employee has given some indication of his or her difficulty69 to management.70
as the Code provides no defences that would have applied in the situation.
66. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353.
67. Ibid
68. But see Re Ottawa Civic Hospital and ONA (1995), 48 L.A.C. (4th) 388. At 398, the arbitrators
conclude that there can be a breach of the Code if an employer fires an employee in ignorance of the
disability that caused problems, and refuses to reinstate a disabled employee once the disability
becomes known to the employer.
69. Despite cases such as Bonner v. Ministry of Health (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/485 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) and
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As already note, once alerted to the need, the employer has a duty to inquire about the
facts of the complainant's medical situation, assess it in relation to the actual job
requirements, and consider reasonable accommodation. Since the duty to accommo-
date rests on the employer, there is no requirement that the employee suggest how
accommodation might be made.
If the employee suggests an accommodation, the employer must give it appropriate
consideration. The employer cannot insist that the accommodation be perfect or
foolproof. An employer who demanded that the employee's physician certify the
safety of the proposed accommodation and that the employee waive any right to sue
the employer in case of further dimage to health was found by the Ontario Divisional
Court to have breached the Code.7 1
When accommodation is requested, many employers react by saying, "If I do it for
you, I'd have to do it for everybody." The first response could well be the serious
question, "Why not?" Most accommodations are neither expensive nor onerous, and
many benefit more than the individual who requested the accommodation. As for
expensive and onerous accommodations, the answer to the employer's question is that
there is no such obligation where there is no claim under the Code.
The employee has some duties as well, summarized by the Supreme Court in Renaud
as follows:
Along with the employer and the union, there is also a duty on the complainant to
assist in securing an appropriate accommodation. The inclusion of the complainant
in the search for accommodation was recognized by this Court in O'Malley. At page
555, McIntyre J. stated:
Where such reasonable steps, however, do not fully reach the desired end, the
complainant, in the absence of some accommodating steps on his own part
such as an acceptance in this case of part-time work, must either sacrifice his
religious principles or his employment.
Reimer v. York Regional Police, [1998] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 17 (Ont. Bd. Inq.), most authority indi-
cates that the employee will not be held to a high standard of clarity in communication. This
approach is in keeping with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada on the need
to interpret human-rights legislation generously and purposively (see, for example, Canadian
National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at
1134). Cases range from situations in which the employer had no knowledge of the disability (see,
for example, Re Ottawa Civic Hospital and ONA, supra note 68, at 398, and Willems-Wilson v.
Allbright Drycleaners (1998), 32 C.H.R.R. D/71 (B.C. H.R.T.)) to situations in which the employee
gave little or no information about the disability, beyond an indication that a disability existed: see
Bielecky v. Young, Macnamara (1992), 20 C.H.R.R. D1/215 (Ont. Bd. Inq.), Belliveau v. Stelco
(1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D1/5250 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) and Koeppel v. Canada (1997), 32 C.H.R.R. D/107
(C.H.R.T.), Conte v. Rogers CablesystemsLtd. (1999), 36 C.H.R.R. D/403 (C.H.R.T.).
70. See discussion of corporate liability in Keene, supra note 2 at 243-46 and 379-80.
71. Emrick Plastics v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1992), 16 C.H.R.R. D/300 at 303-04 (Ont.
Div. Ct.).
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To facilitate the search for an accommodation, the complainant must do his or her
part as well. Concomitant with a search for reasonable accommodation is a duty to
facilitate the search for such an accommodation. Thus in determining whether the
duty of accommodation has been fulfilled the conduct of the complainant must be
considered.
This does not mean that, in addition to bringing to the attention of the employer the
facts relating to discrimination, the complainant has a duty to originate a solution.
While the complainant may be in a position to make suggestions, the employer is in
the best position to determine how the complainant can be accommodated without
undue interference in the operation of the employer's business. When an employer
has initiated a proposal that is reasonable and would, if implemented, fulfil the duty
to accommodate, the complainant has a duty to facilitate the implementation of the
proposal. If failure to take reasonable steps on the part of the complainant causes
the proposal to founder, the complaint will be dismissed. The other aspect .of this
duty is the obligation to accept reasonable accommodation. This is the aspect
referred to by McIntyre J. in O'Malley. The complainant cannot expect a perfect
solution. If a proposal that would be reasonable in all the circumstances is turned
down, the employer's duty is discharged. 72
Although there is a duty to accept accommodation when it is reasonable, arriving at
an agreement may require negotiation, with some trial and error. In Hotel-Dieu
Hospital v. ONA, 73 7 a part-time nurse's employment was terminated pursuant to a
provision in the.collective agreement, which provided that a regular part-time nurse
could be terminated if she was absent from work due to illness for a period of 30
months. When the nurse was first absent, the hospital proposed an alternative position
that would have accommodated her needs, but she declined because her doctor
misinformed her that the proposal was unacceptable. The nurse grieved her termina-
tion. The Board found that the hospital had met its legal obligation to accommodate,
but concluded that the termination was not appropriate in light of the grievor's reliance
on her doctor's misinformation. The Board ordered the grievor reinstated. The Board's
decision was confirmed on appeal.
SUMMARY OF LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES
To sum up, when an employee experiences difficulty in doing his or her job because
of "handicap" as defined in the Code, the employer has a responsibility
1. to initiate the accommodation process by inquiring into the employee's cur-
rent medical condition and capabilities.
2. to review the requirements of the complainant's job to confirm what is essen-
tial. If any requirement is not imposed in good faith or is not strongly and
logically connected to a business necessity, it cannot be maintained.
72. Renaud, supra note 15 at D/439-440.
73. (1996), 89 O.A.C. 249 (Div. Ct.).
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3. to review the remaining elements of the job. If any of the essential elements
cannot be performed by the complainant without accommodation, to con-
sider what accommodation might enable the complainant to perform the
essential elements, and
4. to offer the necessary accommodation unless to do so would cause undue
hardship.
It is the employee's duty "to facilitate the search" for accommodation by supplying
the employer with relevant information. The employee may also be obliged to accept
accommodation that, while not perfect, is reasonable in the circumstances.
